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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH FINANCE COMPANY OF 
SALT LAKE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant~ 
vs. 
'fHOMAS G. PATRICK and MONA 
RAE PATRICK, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
No. 
10179 
The statement of the nature of the case and dispo-
sition in lower court are adequate as stated in appellant's 
brief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks sustainment on the lower court's 
judgment granting the motion to dismiss as to defend-
ant, THOMAS G. PATRICK. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts is adequate as stated in ap-
pellant's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRAN'l,-
ED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
FOR THE REASON THAT PLAINTIFF COL-
LECTED A FEE FROM DEFENDANT SO 
THAT AN INDEPENDENT CREDIT INVES-
TIGATION COULD BE MADE. 
Section 7-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads in 
part as follows: 
"Every industrial loan corporation shall have 
power.'' 
Nowhere in the above statute is it provided that a loan 
company is required by law to charge an investigation 
fee. The statute is on the basis of placing limits rather 
than requiring a charge as against the borrower. 
If a charge of two per cent (27o) or $20.00, which-
ever is smaller, is collected for a credit investigation of 
a prospective borrower, then the plaintiff must rely on 
its investigation and not upon the statements of the 
borrower. The plaintiff is given a choice of collecting 
additional sums of money or relying upon borrower's 
statements. 
-1-
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Further, the statute provides that plaintiff may 
charge "for expenses incurred by it in examining and 
investigating the character and circumstances of the 
borrower." The statute does not allow plaintiff to charge 
two per cent (27o) or $20.00 simply because the plain-
tiff makes a loan. The charges are to be only those 
charges "incurred" by plaintiff, which by definition 
means some accounting is necessary by the plaintiff to 
the borrower. 
It should be noted that the financial statement 
submitted by defendant to plaintiff was one of several 
in the rewriting of his chattel mortgage and note. On 
each instance he was charged an investigation fee of 
two per cent (27o). On the particular note sued upon, 
no investigation was made as to the security on the 
chattel mortgage. 
Plaintiff did not know whether there had been any 
actual costs for investigation, or, in fact, whether an 
investigation had been made. The $19.04 charge was 
made only to give plaintiff additional income in con-
sideration for making the loan. 
It is not reasonable for plaintiff to charge defendant 
$19.04 for an investigation which is not going to be 
made. Likewise, a charge collected from defendant so 
that plaintiff may make an independent investigation 
should place the burden upon plaintiff, as if he was 
relying upon defendant's statements, it would not be 
necessary for plaintiff to charge defendant a fee for an 
investigation. 
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Plaintiff is contending on the one hand that if a 
borrower falsifies his financial statement, this will be 
fraud, but on the other hand since he cannot believe 
what the borrower is saying on his financial statement, 
he will charge the borrower for an independent investi-
gation to verify same. Plaintiff takes a dual and con-
tradictory position of relying on the statements if they 
turn out to be false, and not relying on the statement 
and collecting money ~or an independent investigation 
to prove the statements are correct. 
The rule is similarly stated in 37 Corpus Juris 
Secundum, "Fraud", Section 37- (a), Pages 284 and 
285, as follows: 
" ... one cannot secure redress for fraud where 
he acted in reliance on his own knowledge or 
judgment based on an independent investigation. 
This rule is especially applicable where the rep-
resentee's investigation was undertaken at the 
suggestion of the representor. If it is established 
that the representee relied on his own judgment 
and not on representor's statements, he cannot 
recover, even though he was genuinely deceived 
by the representations, and his investigation was 
of an incomplete or ineffectual character." 
"There is authority holding that, even though 
no investigation was actually made, the fact that 
one was agreed on, will preclude the right to rely 
on representations." See also Parker v. BrainardJ 
91 Wash. 428, 157 P. 1078. 
It will be observed that the authorities relied upon 
by the plaintiff are not directly in point with the issue. 
6 
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Defendant likewise can find no authorities which speci-
fically rule upon the issue in question. 
Defendant did not of his own choosing pay plain-
tiff $19.04 for an investigation. This was demanded by 
plaintiff in consideration for making the loan. If plain-
tiff was relying on defendant's statements, then why 
was defendant charged $19.04 for an independent in-
vestigation? The ans,ver can only be that plaintiff was 
not in fact relying upon the financial statement. 
Plaintiff argues that to allow the dismissal would 
place a premium on fraud, that a borower by paying a 
maximum of $20.00 would be an immunity from his 
fraudulent acts. The simple answer to this is for plaintiff 
not to charge the borrower for an investigation and to 
rely upon the financial statement, or, in the alternative, 
to pay for its own investigation. 
Defendant should not be required to pay plaintiff 
for an independent credit investigation unless in fact 
plaintiff is held to rely on said investigation. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court cor-
rectly granted the motion of the defendant, THOMAS 
G. PATRICK, for summary judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NOLAN J. OLSEN 
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent 
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